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ABSTRACT
Blockchain technology is a crypto-based secure ledger for data
storage and transfer through decentralized, trustless peer-to-peer
systems. Despite its advantages, previous studies have shown that
the technology is not completely secure against cyber aacks. us,
it is crucial to perform domain specific risk analysis to measure
how viable the aacks are on the system, their impact and con-
sequently the risk exposure. Specifically, in this paper, we carry
out an analysis in terms of quantifying the risk associated to an
operational multi-layered Blockchain framework for Smart Mobil-
ity Data-markets (BSMD). We conduct an actor-based analysis to
determine the impact of the aacks. e analysis identified five at-
tack goals and five types of aackers that violate the security of the
blockchain system. In the case study of the public-permissioned
BSMD, we highlight the highest risk factors according to their im-
pact on the victims in terms of monetary, privacy, integrity and
trust. Four aack goals represent a risk in terms of economic losses
and one aack goal contains many threats that represent a risk that
is either unacceptable or undesirable.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, transportation data are shared across multiple entities
and stored in central servers that are susceptible to cyberaacks.
In the recent years, many cybersecurity breaches have occurred
in transportation systems. In 2015, a group of civic hackers deci-
phered and exposed the unstandardized bus system location data
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of Baltimore [13]. e San Francisco transit was hacked to give
free access to commuters for two days [14]. It was recently discov-
ered that Google keeps collecting user location data even if users
explicitly deactivate the tracking system in their mobiles [12].
Blockchain technology creates a distributed consensus, provid-
ing entities with a secure platform that maintains past records of
digital events [4]. In the context of transportation, a multi-layered
Blockchain framework for Smart Mobility Data-market (BSMD)
was recently proposed by Lo´pez and Farooq [8]. BSMD is a per-
missioned blockchain and is designed to solve the privacy, secu-
rity and management issues related to the sharing of passively
as well as actively solicited large-scale mobility data. In another
study, Lo´pez and Farooq [9] proposed a distributed tool for mobil-
ity choice modelling over BSMD, where participants do not share
personal raw data, while all computations are done locally. Eckert
et al. developed a user-centric emission monitoring and trading
system for multi-modal mobility over the BSMD [2]. Another ap-
plication in transportation used BSMD for mode choice inference
using federated learning over blockchain [10].
However, security issues related to blockchain are critical in
terms of cybersecurity. In this sense, security experts need to fully
understand the risk in terms of scope and impact of the security
and privacy challenges related to blockchain before predicting the
potential damage from an aack. Furthermore, verifying whether
the current technology can withstand persistent hacking aempts
is also of utmost importance.
In 2017, Li et al. conducted a comprehensive cybersecurity risk
analysis of blockchain [7]. ey systematically studied the security
threats to blockchain and survey the corresponding real aacks by
examining popular blockchain systems. Although they identified
the threats and their nature, the real scope of the risk that those
threats entail was not described and evaluated. Unlike their work,
we aim at quantifying the risk. We present ordinal values for the
identified risks. Another difference is that in our work, we analyze
a real blockchain system developed for transportation application
i.e. Blockchain for Smart Mobility Data-markets.
e aim of our work is more extensive than the traditional risk
assessment. We estimate the risk through an actor-based risk anal-
ysis based on the impact that the exploitation of vulnerabilities
will have on the transportation systems using BSMD. Efficient de-
tection mechanisms are desired in this context to reduce the risk
that various threats entail on the blockchain systems used in trans-
portation domain. Countermeasures to avoid cyberaacks must be
implemented as a security-by-design practice.
is paper is organized as follows. Related work is provided in
Section 2. In Section 3, we present the methodology followed by
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the actor-based risk analysis of a blockchain in transportation do-
main in section 4. Finally, conclusion and future work are outlined
in Section 5.
2 RELATED WORK
In the last decade, several studies have exposed vulnerabilities in
the technologies employed in blockchain. Particularly, for research
in blockchain cybersecurity risk analysis, we summarize the find-
ings in Table 1.
Li et al. [7] performed a systematic examination of the risks as-
sociated with the popular blockchain systems (i.e. Ethereum, Bit-
coin, Monero, RSK, Counterpaty, Stellar, Monax, Lisk), the corre-
sponding real aacks, and the security enhancements. ey eval-
uated the real aacks on popular blockchain systems from 2009 to
2017 and analyzed the vulnerabilities exploited in these cases.
Rather than popular blockchain systems, Atzei et al. [1] fo-
cused on Ethereum smart contracts. From a security program-
ming perspective, their work analyzed the security vulnerabilities
of Ethereum smart contracts, and provided a taxonomy of com-
mon programming pitfalls that may lead to vulnerabilities. ey
show a series of aacks on smart contracts that exploit these vul-
nerabilities, allowing an adversary to steal money or cause other
damage.
In contrast to previous studies, Homoliak et al. [5] proposed a
security reference architecture based on models that demonstrate
the stacked hierarchy of various threats (similar to the ISO/OSI hi-
erarchy). In order to isolate the various nature of security threats,
the stacked hierarchy consisted of four layers (Network layer, con-
sensus layer, replicated state machine layer and application layer).
ey also proposed a threat-risk assessment of the reference archi-
tecture using the ISO/IEC 15408 template. With the stacked model,
different threat-agents and threats appear at each layer. ey iden-
tified four threat-agents: service providers, consensus nodes, de-
velopers and users. ey are malicious entities whose intention is
to steal assets, break functionalities, or disrupt services.
Although the previous studies identified the threats and their
nature, the real scope of the risk that those threats entail is not
described. We consider that although there are vulnerabilities in a
system, it is the impact that certain exploitation has on the nodes
of the blockchain network that determines whether the vulnerabil-
ity represents a significant risk or not. In this line of thought, we
have carried out an actor-based risk analysis that we applied to the
multi-layered blockchain for smart mobility data-market.
3 METHODOLOGY
e aim of ourwork is to perform an actor-based risk analysis. It is
more extensive than the traditional risk assessment in the manner
that the methodology enables us to quantify the risk. antifying
the risk refines the analysis and gives an order of magnitude of the
risk exposure. Also, measuring the risk enables to beer grasp the
impact of the aacks on large-scale systems or ecosystems where
many technologies are to be evaluated by the risk assessment.
In the following, we define some cybersecurity and risk assess-
ment terms in order to facilitate the reading of our work.
• Actor: An entity that violates integrity, privacy or confi-
dentiality to obtain certain benefit.
• Victim: An entity that is the subject of a cyberaack.
• Attack goal: Final effect desired by the actor aiming on
producing an impact on the victim.
• Scenario: Set of actions carried out by the actor to achieve
its aack goal.
• Impact: antification of the aack goalfis effect on the
victim.
• reat: Oen called the actor scenario pair, is the combi-
nation of the entity who commits the act, the actor, and
the way it is commied, the scenario, in order to produce
a negative impact.
• Vulnerability: A flaw that offers the opportunity to dam-
age a system.
e first step of the actor-based risk analysis is to identify poten-
tial aackers, i.e. actors who would be interested in the ecosystem
under study. e next step is to determine the aack goals of the
actors. Finally, Table 2 is used to quantify the impact on the victim
of such aack goals according to a four-level scale.
We follow this methodology to determine the impact that re-
sults from aacks on the BSMD ecosystem, a realistic blockchain
system. Specifically, Lopez and Farooq [8] proposed the Blockchain
for Smart Mobility Data-markets, which is composed of nodes: In-
dividuals, Companies, Universities andGovernment (transport, cen-
sus, planing and development agencies). e nodes collect their
own data and store it in identifications. Each node is the sole
owner of their data and can share their information by showing
other nodes their identifications or parts of it. In the blockchain
there are smart contracts available that the nodes need to sign be-
fore any transaction of information is conducted. An actor-based
risk analysis is conducted on this system.
4 ACTOR-BASED RISK ANALYSIS OF BSMD
e methodology in our work can be applied to any cybersecu-
rity analysis. Here, we describe its application on BSMD, a cyber
physical transportation system, but the risk evaluation methodol-
ogy is not constrained to blockchain and can be applied to other
technologies or generic blockchain systems.
In the first step, we need to identify cyber threat sources (poten-
tial aackers) and their aack goals in the context of smart mobil-
ity data-markets.
4.1 Cyber threat sources
Cyber aackers exploit the systems for financial gains, obtaining
information, conducting sabotage activities, creating disinforma-
tion, and degrading confidence in the ecosystem. e Industrial
Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) has
characterized a cyber threat source as: “personswho aempt unau-
thorized access to a control system device and/or network using
a data communications pathway [3].” It further classifies these
threat sources into four groups (A1 through A4). e taxonomy
of cyber threat sources was introduced for traditional threats to
purely Information Technology (IT) infrastructure. We propose to
use the same taxonomy in the context of cyber threats against the
BSMD ecosystem—since it is composed of both IT elements and of
cyber physical systems that have an IT component. In the context
of threats against the BSMD ecosystem, we added a new threat
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Table 1: Previous studies in blockchain cybersecurity risk analysis.
Studies Methodology Drawbacks
Li et al., [7]
- Systematic examination on security risks for
popular blockchain systems.
- e real scope of the risk that those
threats entail is not described.
- Survey the real aacks on blockchain systems
(Ethereum, Bitcoin, Monero, RSK, Counterpaty,
Stellar, Monax, Lisk).
- Do not consider the risk as being a func-
tion of probability and impact.
- Analyze related vulnerabilities exploited.
Atzei et al., [1]
- Analyzed the security vulnerabilities of
Ethereum smart contracts.
- Isolated the analysis from a security pro-
gramming perspective only.
- Show a series of aacks which exploit these
vulnerabilities.
- ey do not account for the various na-
ture of security threats.
Homoliak et al., [5]
- Stacked hierarchy of four layers. - ey donfit quantify the risk.
- Identified four threat agents. - Generic architecture was not evaluated
on a realistic blockchain system.
- Report vulnerabilities at each layer.
Table 2: Impact levels for mobility data-market adapted from ICS-CERT [3]
Type Level Description of the impact
Monetary
1 Minor monetary loss
2 Significant monetary loss
3 Severe monetary loss
4 Catastrophic monetary loss
Privacy
1 Minor impact on the privacy of any of the nodes
in BSMD (Individuals, Companies, Universities
and Government)
2 Significant on the privacy of the nodes in BSMD
3 Severe on the privacy of the nodes in BSMD
4 Catastrophic on the privacy of the nodes in BSMD
Integrity
1 Minor impact on the integrity of the mobility data,
transactions and integrity of the users
2 Significant impact on the integrity of the mobility
data, transactions and integrity of the users
3 Severe impact on the integrity of the mobility data,
transactions and integrity of the users
4 Catastrophic impact on the integrity of the mobility
data, transactions and integrity of the users
Trust
1 Minor impact on the trust of the BSMD network
2 Significant impact on the trust of the BSMD network
3 Severe impact on the trust of the BSMD network
4 Catastrophic impact on the trust of the BSMD
group that we call “insider threat”. We suppose it is a determined
node with elevated economic means and high motives. e details
of various actors are described below:
A1. Cybercriminals: is group includes traditional cyber-
criminals that use compromised computer systems to commit iden-
tity the and leverage the blockchain network for a variety of ma-
licious activities, mostly for monetary gain. ey may be passive
nodes such as small businesses, individuals, data collectors, or oth-
ers.
A2. Industrial spies: Organizations that compromise the com-
puter systems to illegally acquire intellectual property, know-how,
trade, and commercial secrets, or other kinds of corporate confi-
dential information. is kind of espionage may occur between
competing corporations, for economic reasons.
A3. Foreign Intelligence Agencies: Foreign state-based orga-
nizations that use computer systems to acquire sensitive informa-
tion on opposing states, corporations or individuals, or otherwise
influence their actions.
A4. Terrorist groups: Organizations seeking to create public
disorder or sow national terror, by commiing destructive violent
acts.
A5. Insider threat: e insider threat is a corrupted active
node of the blockchain network (Government, University, Com-
pany or other), or an infrastructure node such as a network opera-
tor, an Internet Service Provider (ISP) that maliciously exploits the
blockchain system.
4.2 Attack goals
We identify five aack goals and present them in Table 3. We de-
scribe them herein.
G1 - Gain knowledge about the data-market
ere is significant competition between companies that pro-
duce transportation information. For example, telecommunication
companies generate data that can be used for transportation mod-
eling. Similarly, the logs of available mobile devices registered by
cellphone towers can be used to monitor traffic. Companies are in
control of their data. Accordingly, the BSMD ecosystem could be a
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Table 3: Attack goals against the blockchain framework for smart mobility data-markets
Goal Example
G1 - Gain knowledge about the data-
market
In 2015, a group of civic hackers deciphered and exposed the unstan-
dardized bus system location data of Baltimore [13].
G2 - Access sensitive data on the nodes of
the network
It was recently discovered that Google keeps collecting user location
data even if they explicitly deactivate the tracking system in their mo-
biles [12]. In 2016, information of 57 million Uber customers and dri-
vers were leaked [15].
G3 - Manipulate and modify blockchain
information
In 2016, criminals manipulated Smart contracts in the Ethereum
blockchain with a DAO hack (Decentralized Autonomous Organiza-
tion), to steal around 60 million dollars [11].
G4 - Sabotage activities In 2016, the San Francisco transit was hacked to give free access to
commuters for two days [14].
G5 - Induce participants in the blockchain
network to make errors
In the Bitcoin network, with a double spending aack on fast pay-
ments, it was shown in [6] that nodes in the networks may not detect
an invalid transactions and add it into the secure ledger. e aacker
thus enjoys a service without paying.
target for industrial spies (A2) aiming to obtain knowledge about
the data-market. Subsequently, such information could be sold to
competing companies. Furthermore, this information is also valu-
able for criminal groups (A1), intelligence services (A3) and ter-
rorist groups (A4) because it allows them to undertake aacks by
maliciously exploiting the knowledge about the data-market.
G2 - Access sensitive data on the nodes of the network
Mobility data is continuously generated by different nodes of
the BSMD network. According to the identification layer of the
multi-layered blockchain model for smart mobility data market,
transportation data is stored in files called Identification. Each
entity contains metadata, static data and dynamic data. Nodes
need consent from the owner to access the static and dynamic data
which can be aractive to many actors.
On the other hand, nodes communicate with each other using
Decentralized Identifiers (DID). DIDs are the gates for sharing data
via peer-to-peer connections where the information is transferred
using an asymmetric encryption. DIDs represent sensitive infor-
mation because a given node will have one unique DID per trans-
action. Any leakage of this information enables to correlate DIDs
in the ledger to track single nodes and obtain information on trans-
actions. Intelligence services (A3) and terrorist groups (A4) would
be interested in having this information because it would allow
them to aain their ultimate goal of surveillance, assassination,
etc. Cybercriminal groups (A1)would be interested in this informa-
tion to obtain monetary gain since mobility data is highly valued.
rough unsolicited sharing of information, their clients could be
for example insurance companies (medical or automotive) thatmay
use information on an individualfis daily activity paerns to assess
the cost of insurance premiums or simply refuse coverage. Indus-
trial spies (A2) may take advantage of the blockchain to find cus-
tomers and improve their business.
G3 fi Manipulate and modify blockchain information
Blockchains aremade to be practically immutable, where, in the-
ory no one can modify the blockchain’s ’distributed ledger’ of all
commied blocks. e blockchain relies on the distributed con-
sensus mechanism to achieve immutability and to establish mutual
trust. Vulnerabilities in the consensus mechanism can be exploited
by aackers to control the blockchain by manipulating and mod-
ifying the blockchain information. Criminal groups (A1), intelli-
gence services (A3) and terrorist groups (A4) may want to reverse,
exclude or modify the ordering of transactions. An insider threat
(A5) may hamper normal mining operations of other miners or im-
pede the confirmation operation of normal transactions.
G4 fi Sabotage activities
Cybercriminals (A1) may use the blockchain ecosystem for sab-
otage activities. Since the process is anonymous, it is hard to track
user behaviors, let alone subject to legal sanctions. For example,
criminals can leverage smart contracts for a variety of malicious
activities, whichmay pose a threat to our daily life. Criminal Smart
Contracts can facilitate the leakage of confidential information,
the of cryptographic keys, and various real-world crimes.
Sabotage activities may also be conducted by intelligence ser-
vices (A3) and terrorist groups (A4) to disrupt the blockchain net-
work or make victims view of the blockchain filtered. As programs
running in the blockchain, smart contracts may have security vul-
nerabilities caused by program defects. Aackers may exploit the
vulnerabilities to send malware and infect nodes or to initiate De-
nial of Service (DoS) aacks on the nodes of the blockchain. e
aacks may cause a waste of hard disk resources and decreased
node speed. An insider threat (A5) may be a corrupted node who
wants to intercept the network traffic of the blockchain to poten-
tially delay network messages. An aacker may want to monopo-
lize all of the victim’s incoming and outgoing connections, which
isolates the victim from the other peers in the network. en, the
aacker can filter the victim’s view of the blockchain, or let the
victim cost unnecessary computing power on obsolete views of
the blockchain.
G5 fi Induce participants in the blockchain network to
make errors
ere are several companies, municipalities and individuals pro-
ducing transportation information which is valuable to govern-
ments, researchers and people. For example, one of the respon-
sabilities of the government is to collect data in order to model,
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manage and improve transportation networks. Some malicious ac-
tors may inject the ecosystem with falsified transportation infor-
mation via hacked traffic detectors, tolls, parking and smartcards.
e participants of the blockchain network would end up making
sub-optimal decision. e aackers may be interested in damag-
ing the reputation of some company, or they may sow distrust in
the government or any entity of the network. Aackers could in-
clude actors A1, A3, A4 and A5 identified in the previous section.
us, inducing participants to make errors not only would they be
achieving their goal, but they would also be evading the responsi-
bilities of their actions by making their interference less detectable.
4.3 Impact of attack goals
Independently of the various actors goals, aacks will have an im-
pact on the victim. e victim may be the individuals, the BSMD
network or any of the active or passive node in the BSMD (data
collectors, Companies, Universities and Government). In order to
account for the various types of consequences that these aacks
could have on them, we measure the impact according to four sep-
arate aspects: Monetary (M), Privacy (P), Integrity (I) and Trust
(T). e impact scale ranges from 1 to 4, with 4 being the highest
impact level (most severe). e impact levels are described in Ta-
ble 2. e actor-based risk analysis is presented in Table 4. e
explanation of the impact analysis by aack goal follows.
G1 (M) Mobility data is very profitable, and competition be-
tween companies that seek to take advantage of the blockchain to
use the data to improve their business is fierce. (P) While confiden-
tial, the information disclosedwould not have severe consequences
on the individuals. (T) e aack will have a minor impact on the
trust in the BSMD network.
G2 (P) While confidential, the information disclosed would not
have severe consequences (except maybe in terms of insurability)
and is likely to be otherwise available to actors through other more
traditional forms of cyberaacks not related to the BSMD. (M)e
disclosure of this informationmay be grounds for legal action against
the agency, government bodies and concerned companies. (T) e
aack will have a significant impact on the trust and will degrade
confidence in the BSMD network.
G3 (M) In the context of data markets, tampering of a service
can produce losses ofmillions of dollars to companies. For example
companies that take advantage of the blockchain to find customers.
Also, government and transport agencies activities to improve mo-
bility will suffer severe monetary losses. (P) Modifying blockchain
information will have a significant impact on the privacy of any
of the nodes in BSMD (Individuals, Companies, Universities and
Government). (I) A tampered node’s blockchain account will have
catastrophic impact on the integrity of the mobility data, transac-
tions and integrity of the user. (T) Similarly, the aack will have
catastrophic impact on the trust of the BSMD network because the
nodes will have no belief in the reliability or truth of the transac-
tions in the ledger.
G4 (M) Malicious activities will induce severe monetary loss on
the victim of the aack. For example, network hijacking, crimi-
nal smart contracts and ransomwares will exploit the victim in ex-
change of money. Also, sabotage activities will induce the vendor
to not get rewards for its service. (I) e aacks will have a signifi-
cant impact on the integrity of the mobility data, transactions and
integrity of the users. (T) Finally, disruption of the network will
have severe impact on the trust of the BSMD.
G5 (M) Injecting the ecosystem with falsified transportation in-
formation will induce significant monetary loss on the victim of
the aack. (I) e aack will have a severe impact on the integrity
of the mobility data, transactions and integrity of the users. (T)
Also, if participants relying on the mobility data acquired from
the blockchain make errors in the modeling, management and im-
provement of transportation networks, it will degrade confidence
and have a severe impact on the trust of the BSMD.
4.4 Discussion
is analysis responds to the needs of several groups such as com-
panies, regulators, manufacturers, transportation agencies and even
individuals. Eachwill be able to identify the riskiest threat, the one
to treat with priority. From the results in Table 4, depending on the
ranking obtained, a specific given riskmanagement strategy can be
applied. ere are many strategies for managing the risk, namely:
refuse, accept, transfer or reduce the risk.
e most drastic one is refusing the risk. It is applied when the
laer is unacceptable because of the catastrophic consequences it
may have on the victims. e victims may be the individuals, uni-
versities, companies, transport agencies or any of the government
nodes of the blockchain network. In this case, vulnerabilities in
the blockchain system that are exploited by aackers should be re-
moved from the system because of the security threat they pose.
e strategy of accepting the risk is applied when the risk is either
negligible or acceptable. In this case, the benefits that the system
brings are greater than the potential risk. Transferring the risk
strategy consists in giving the risk management responsibility to
a third party, i.e. insurance companies. Finally, the risk mitigation
strategy consists on reducing the risk as much as possible. is
can be done through different means, such as the deployment of
preventive mechanisms, security updates of the systems or stricter
regulations.
In terms of monetary, privacy, integrity and trust, we note that
G1 does not represent a potential risk that needs to be managed.
However, G3 contains many threats that represent a risk that is
either unacceptable or undesirable.
From another angle, in terms of monetary impact, aack goals
G2, G3, G4 and G5 represent a risk in terms of economic losses.
For example, network hijacking, criminal smart contracts and ran-
somwares will exploit the victim in exchange of money. Also, sab-
otage activities will induce the vendor to not get rewards for its
service. is monetary impact may concern certain groups or or-
ganizations more than another. us, they would want to manage
the risk by implementing the appropriate security defense mech-
anisms. For example, it is essential to ensure that cryptographic
keys are stored or maintained properly so that the aacker aim-
ing at accessing sensitive data on the nodes of the network do not
exploit improper key protection mechanisms to aain the aack
goal.
On the other hand, in terms of privacy impact, the results reveal
that G2 is the riskiest aack goal. For example, aacks conducted
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Table 4: Impact on the victims by attack goal - Monetary (M), Privacy (P), Integrity (I) and Trust (T). Impact scale ranges from
1 to 4, with 4 being the most severe.
Attack goals M P I T
G1-Gain knowledge about the data-market 1 2 - 1
G2-Access sensitive data on the nodes of the network 2 3 - 2
G3-Manipulate and modify blockchain information 3 2 4 4
G4-Sabotage activities 3 - 2 3
G5-Induce participants in the blockchain network to
make errors
2 - 3 3
by A1 may represent an undesirable risk that needs to be man-
aged, i.e. cybercriminals that use compromised computer systems
to commit identity the. e compromise could lead to fraudulent
transactions. Vulnerabilities should be eliminated by implement-
ing efficient privacy preservation techniques and adopting more
robust VPN solutions.
In terms of integrity impact, particularly when it comes to the
manipulation and modification of blockchain information, we no-
tice from the results that this aack goal represents a major risk in
terms of integrity. Also, this same aack goal has a catastrophic im-
pact on the trust of the blockchain system because the nodes will
have no belief in the reliability or truth of the transactions in the
ledger. Among other solutions, threats should be managed by set-
ting proper identity management (Membership Service Providers).
Finally, when it comes to inducing participants in the blockchain
network to make errors, we notice from the results, that this at-
tack goal represents a major risk in terms of integrity and trust in
the blockchain ecosystem. To manage the risk, solutions should
be implemented specifically regarding unauthenticated data feeds
producing wrong data.
5 CONCLUSION
We have proposed an actor-based risk assessment for the multi-
layered Blockchain framework for Smart Mobility Data-markets
(BSMD), a public-permissioned blockchain. Traditionally, the aim
of the risk assessment is to evaluate the risk in order to identify
the riskiest threat. e aim of our work is more extensive in that
we propose a risk analysis enabling the quantification of the risk
associated not only to the blockchain technology, but also to its
ecosystem. Moreover, we conducted the risk assessment methodol-
ogy on a realistic blockchain for smart mobility data-markets with
analysis of the aacks with regards to their impact at four scales
(economy, privacy, integrity and trust). We quantify the risk by
presenting ordinal values, which gives the decision makers a clear
ranking in terms of prioritization.
is work is the first step of a systematic risk assessment frame-
work. We consider that although there are vulnerabilities in a sys-
tem, it is their probability of exploitation and the impact that this
exploitation has that determines whether the vulnerability repre-
sents a significant risk or not. In future work, we will extend the
analysis and propose a scenario-based risk assessment followed
by a combined risk assessment. e scenario-based analysis de-
termines the probability of occurrence of each threat. e com-
bined analysis aims at determining which aack outcomes have
the highest risk according to their impact on the victims. We hope
to uncover specific blockchain technology security vulnerabilities
in the transportation ecosystem by exposing new aack vectors.
e systematic risk analysis can then be used to develop possible
countermeasures against cybersecurity vulnerabilities in the smart
mobility implementations of the blockchain technology.
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